USA v. Booker by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-2-2012 
USA v. Booker 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Booker" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 628. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/628 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 07-2835 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
      v. 
 
CHRISTOPHER BOOKER 
 
                  Appellant 
___________ 
  
APPEAL FROM THE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (D.C. Crim. Action No. 05-cr-0170-05) 
District Judge: Honorable John R. Padova 
______________ 
 
Argued April 11, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
______________ 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 2, 2012) 
2 
 
______________ 
 
 
Thomas A. Dreyer (argued) 
6 Dickinson Drive 
Building 100 – Suite 106 
Chadds Ford, PA 19317 
 Counsel for Appellant Christopher Booker 
 
Zane David Memeger, United States Attorney 
Robert Zauzmer, Assistant United States Attorney (argued) 
Joseph T. Labrum III, Assistant United States Attorney 
United States Attorney‟s Office 
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
Counsel for Appellee United States of America 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 This case arises from the District Court‟s entry of 
judgment of conviction and sentence as well as the denial of 
Appellant Christopher Booker‟s pre-trial motion to suppress 
all post-arrest statements.  Booker participated in a bank 
robbery with other co-conspirators.  After being arrested on 
unrelated charges, he provided incriminating statements to the 
police.  In a pre-trial motion, Booker asked the District Court 
to suppress these statements as violations of his Miranda 
rights.  The District Court denied his motion.  Before trial, 
Booker requested that he be allowed to proceed pro se.  The 
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District Court conducted a hearing and warned him of the 
consequences of self-representation.  While articulating the 
potential sentences facing him, the District Court erred and 
misstated one of the relevant mandatory minimums (stating it 
was five years and not twenty-five years).  Booker was 
convicted of all charges, and he now appeals the District 
Court‟s judgment and sentence.  For the reasons stated herein, 
we will vacate the District Court‟s judgment and sentence and 
remand the case to the District Court for a new trial.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
 On June 15, 2004, Christopher Booker, Burnie Tindale 
and Jeryle Sowell robbed a Citizens Bank in Brookhaven, 
Pennsylvania.  During the robbery, each man brandished a 
handgun and wore a stocking mask and gloves.  Booker‟s 
specific role in the crime was to guard the front door.  The 
men stole $52,935.75.  This particular robbery was part of a 
series of similar bank robberies.  Each of the other robberies 
entailed a similar method of operation and involved detailed 
dress rehearsals. 
Miranda Rights and Police Questioning 
 On October 24, 2004, Booker was arrested in Atlantic 
City, New Jersey on charges of unlawful possession of 
firearms and cocaine base.  These charges are not related to 
the bank robbery offenses.  While in custody for the drug and 
firearm charges, officers advised him of his Miranda rights, 
and he refused to waive them, invoking his Fifth Amendment 
right to remain silent and Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  
Booker was appointed counsel to represent him on those 
unrelated charges and was held in custody at the Atlantic City 
Correctional Facility (ACCF).   
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 The Darby Borough Police, who were investigating 
Booker in connection with an unrelated case, spoke to him 
while at ACCF.  They told Special Agent Roselli that Booker 
had expressed an interest in talking to the FBI about some 
bank robberies.  Agent Roselli went to speak with Booker on 
November 30, 2004.  He advised Booker of his Miranda 
rights and had him initial and sign a FD-395 advice and 
consent form.  During this conversation, Booker made 
incriminating statements, discussing the Citizens Bank 
robbery, identifying his co-conspirators and providing details 
about his own role in the robbery.   
 Agent Roselli spoke with Booker again on December 
8, 2004, where he again advised him of his Miranda rights 
and had him initial and sign the same FD-395 advice and 
consent form.  Booker made additional incriminating 
statements about the robberies.  Finally, on December 22, 
2004, Agent Roselli travelled to ACCF to assume custody of 
Booker.  He advised him of his Miranda rights, which Booker 
acknowledged and waived.  Booker then made some 
voluntary statements in the car regarding the drug and firearm 
charges. 
Proceeding Pro se and Conviction 
 Booker was charged with one count of conspiracy to 
commit armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 
(Count One), one count of committing and aiding and 
abetting the commission of armed bank robbery, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d) and (2) (Count Four), and one count 
of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence and 
aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm in 
relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 
924(c) and (2) (Count Five).  Before trial, he moved to 
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suppress the oral statements that he made to Roselli on 
November 30, 2004, December 8, 2004 and December 22, 
2004.  The District Court conducted a hearing on the issue 
and denied the motion, finding that “Booker initiated his 
conversations with Special Agent Roselli by asking to speak 
to the FBI about bank robberies and by asking to meet with 
Special Agent Roselli again at the conclusion of their 
November 30, 2004 meeting.”  (App. at 142).  The District 
Court then found that “Booker was given his Miranda rights 
and that Booker voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 
waived those rights.”  (App. at 142-43). 
 Booker filed a motion to proceed pro se on January 10, 
2007.  The District Court held an ex parte hearing on the 
motion, outside the presence of the Government.  At the 
hearing, the Court warned Booker of the downside to self-
representation and strongly encouraged him to consider 
proceeding with counsel.  The Court advised him that the 
sentencing guidelines would be used to determine his 
sentence should he be found guilty and apprised him of the 
fact that his sentences could run consecutively.  The Court 
then advised Booker of each charge that he faced and the 
potential sentences for each crime.  Specifically, the Court 
stated that he faced a maximum of five years imprisonment 
for Count One, a maximum of twenty years imprisonment for 
Count Four and a five year mandatory minimum for Count 
Five (provided that he committed two or less prior crimes of 
violence).
1
  Booker insisted that he be allowed to represent 
                                              
1
 This is an incorrect articulation of the penalty scheme for 
Counts Four and Five.  The maximum penalty for Count Four 
was twenty-five years, not twenty years as the District Court 
stated.  Although our review of the record indicates that the 
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himself.
2
  The District Court granted Booker‟s motion to 
proceed pro se and allowed him to retain previous counsel 
(Mr. Ingram) as standby counsel.   
 On February 1, 2007, a jury found Booker guilty of 
Counts One, Four and Five.  He was sentenced to sixty 
months of imprisonment on Count One; 262 months of 
imprisonment on Count Four; and 300 months of 
imprisonment on Count Five (to run consecutive to the 262 
months for Counts One and Four).   
                                                                                                     
District Court erred in its statement, Booker has not objected 
to this error.  Therefore, it presents an issue that we need not 
resolve.   
The mandatory minimum for Count Five was twenty-five 
years, not five years, because Booker had been convicted of 
another § 924(c) charge in an unrelated case before the 
District of New Jersey (“the New Jersey Case”).  
Consequently, his conviction in this case was his second and 
triggered a mandatory twenty-five year consecutive sentence, 
which the Court also failed to advise Booker.  The 
Government concedes that the District Court erred in this part 
of the colloquy.   
2
 Booker stated that he would do a better job than a trained 
lawyer because he would be more aggressive in cross-
examination and because he did not have ties with the 
prosecution.  He insisted that he would be careful with his 
questioning and indicated that he was aware of what he was 
doing.  (App. at 121-23). 
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 Booker now appeals the judgment and sentence on two 
grounds.  First, he argues that the District Court deprived him 
of his right to counsel when it failed to accurately inform him 
of the range of possible punishments he faced on Count Five 
before allowing him to proceed without counsel.  
Specifically, Booker avers that the District Court erred in its 
colloquy on Count Five by articulating an incorrect 
mandatory minimum, not mentioning that the twenty-five 
year mandatory minimum had to run consecutive to any and 
all other sentences and failing to inform him that the 
maximum punishment he faced was life imprisonment.  
Second, he alleges that the District Court misapplied the law 
when it found that Booker had waived his Miranda rights.
3
   
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction, pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction over an appeal of the 
District Court‟s judgment and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  See United States v. Duka, 
671 F.3d 329, 336 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court‟s 
finding that a defendant has knowingly and intelligently 
relinquished his right to counsel.  United States v. Bankoff, 
613 F.3d 358, 373 (3d Cir. 2010).  “When a waiver is deemed 
ineffective (i.e., not knowing, intelligent and voluntary), there 
                                              
3
 At oral argument, Booker conceded that he had waived the 
Miranda issue by not presenting it to the District Court.  See 
United States v. Rose 538, F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Therefore, we will focus our subsequent analysis solely on 
the waiver of counsel issue. 
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is no harmless error review, and the conviction must be 
vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.”  United States 
v. Jones, 452 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 137 (3d Cir. 2002) (characterizing an 
error in assessing whether a defendant may proceed pro se as 
a structural error).  In determining whether a waiver is 
ineffective, we must “indulge every reasonable presumption 
against a waiver of counsel.”  Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 
790 (3d Cir. 2000).       
III.  ANALYSIS 
 “The right to counsel embodied within the Sixth 
Amendment carries as its corollary the right to proceed pro 
se.”  Peppers, 302 F.3d at 129.   
 [S]ince a person cannot secure the right 
to proceed pro se without sacrificing the right to 
counsel, we have required defendants to assert 
the right to proceed pro se affirmatively and 
unequivocally, and we have placed on the court 
the burden of establishing that the defendant 
who does so acts voluntarily, and that he 
understands both the scope of the right 
sacrificed and the restrictions and challenges 
that he will face. 
Id.  As the Supreme Court has indicated, a defendant must 
knowingly and intelligently forgo the traditional benefits 
associated with the right to counsel before he can proceed in 
representing himself.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
835 (1975).  In United States v. Moskovits, 86 F.3d 1303 (3d 
Cir. 1996), we articulated a standard for determining whether 
a waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and intelligent:   
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 For a waiver of the right to counsel to be 
knowing and intelligent, which it must be in 
order to be valid, the defendant should be made 
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, so that the record will establish 
that he knows what he is doing and his choice is 
made with eyes open.  To ensure that a 
defendant truly appreciates the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation,   . . . a 
defendant‟s waiver must be made with an 
apprehension of the nature of the charges, the 
statutory offenses included within them, and the 
range of allowable punishments thereunder.   
Id. at 1306 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
If a defendant‟s waiver falls short of this standard, the error is 
structural in nature and requires us to remand the case to the 
lower court for a new trial.  Peppers, 302 F.3d at 137.  
 While our precedent reveals no “talismanic formula” 
for determining when a colloquy has yielded a defective 
waiver, we have stated that “the District Court‟s inquiry must 
establish that the defendant understands all risks and 
consequences associated with his decision for self-
representation, and even [if] the colloquy skips just one of the 
[relevant] factors, it fails to establish that the waiver is 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”  Jones, 452 F.3d at 229, 
231 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 
Peppers, 302 F.3d at 135.   
 In applying these standards, we previously have found 
constitutional error where a district court, amongst other 
omissions, fails to inform a defendant of the magnitude of the 
sentence that he could receive as a career offender and the 
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fact that a prior conviction raised the maximum punishment.  
Jones, 452 F.3d at 232.
4
 
 The critical question before us is whether Booker 
made a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel where the 
District Court failed to adequately inform him of the range of 
possible punishments that he faced.  In describing the nature 
of the charges and the range of possible punishments, the 
District Court outlined all three of the charges and 
summarized the possible penalties for each count as follows
5
: 
                                              
4
 In Jones, we highlighted the district court‟s failure to 
properly advise a defendant of the magnitude of the sentence 
he could receive in light of his criminal history as one of 
several important issues that escaped examination.  Amongst 
the other errors were a failure to inquire whether the 
defendant understood the possible defenses available to him, 
a failure to explain that the court could not assist him during 
trial and a failure to discuss the potential problems that an 
incarcerated defendant may face in putting on his own 
defense (e.g., obtaining evidence and interviewing witnesses).     
5
 In Peppers, we outlined three skeletal requirements to reflect the 
obligations placed upon the district court when a defendant seeks to 
proceed pro se:   
 
1.  The defendant must assert his desire to 
proceed pro se clearly and unequivocally. 
 
2.  The court must inquire thoroughly to satisfy 
itself that the defendant understands the nature 
of the charges, the range of possible 
punishments, potential defenses, technical 
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THE COURT: Okay.  So, in count one you‟re 
charged with conspiracy to commit armed bank 
robbery.  You are also charged with one count 
of committing and aiding and abetting the 
commission of an armed bank robbery of the 
Citizens Bank located in Brookhaven, 
Pennsylvania on June 15, 2004.  You‟re also 
charged with one count of use and carrying a 
firearm during a crime of violence and aiding 
and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm in 
relation to a crime of violence on June 15, 2004.  
You do understand that that‟s what you‟re 
charged with in this case. 
DEFENDANT BOOKER: Yes, Your Honor. 
. . .  
                                                                                                     
problems that the defendant may encounter, and 
any other facts important to a general 
understanding of the risks involved. 
 
3.  The court must assure itself that the 
defendant is competent to stand trial. 
 
Peppers, 302 F.3d at 132 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted) (emphasis added).  To provide tangible 
guidance on how courts should proceed in conducting a 
sufficient inquiry into the knowing and voluntary nature of a 
defendant‟s waiver, we have emphasized questions from the 
Federal Judicial Center, Benchbook for U.S. District Court 
Judges § 1.02 (4th ed. 2000).  Id. at 136-37.  Our analysis 
here does not disturb the utility of the suggested colloquy set 
forth in Peppers.   
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THE COURT: Okay.  With respect to the [sic] 
count one, which charges you with conspiracy, 
if you are found guilty of that crime, then the 
Court may impose an assessment of $100, could 
sentence you to a term of up to five years in 
prison and could fine you as much as $250,000.  
Do you understand that? 
DEFENDANT BOOKER: Yes, Your Honor. 
. . .  
THE COURT: And if you‟re found guilty of the 
crime charged in count four, then the Court 
must impose an assessment of $100 and you 
could be sentenced up to 20 years in prison.  
And you could be fined as much as $250,000.  
Do you understand that? 
DEFENDANT BOOKER: Yes, Your Honor.  
THE COURT: And if you‟re found guilty of the 
crime charged in count five, the Court must 
impose an assessment of $100; and if you have 
two or less prior crimes of violence, then the 
Court must sentence you to five years in prison.  
That‟s the five-year statutory mandatory 
minimum that we‟re talking about.  And if you 
have more than two, then the statutory 
mandatory minimum will increase considerably, 
you understand that. 
DEFENDANT BOOKER: Yes, Your Honor. 
(App. at 150-53).    
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 Unlike our other cases referencing this issue, which 
focus on the comprehensiveness of the colloquy, the District 
Court seemed to address all of the relevant factors to establish 
a proper wavier.  The District Court informed Booker that his 
decision was inadvisable, cautioned him that it could not 
assist him during the trial, inquired whether he understood the 
possible defenses available to him, discussed the potential 
problems obtaining evidence and locating witnesses as an 
incarcerated defendant and made him aware of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
The District Court also asked specific questions regarding 
Booker‟s reason for wanting to proceed pro se and candidly 
informed him of the consequences of his request.  The 
significant shortcomings in the colloquy were the District 
Court‟s errors regarding the range of possible punishments 
Booker faced under Count Five (“the § 924(c) charge”).  
There is no dispute between the parties regarding these errors.  
We must now determine whether these errors invalidate 
Booker‟s waiver.  We hold that they do.   
 Booker argues that the District Court failed to advise 
him of the range of potential sentences that he faced under 
Count Five.  Specifically, Booker suggests that the District 
Court committed three errors in this regard.  First, it failed to 
inform him that he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 
twenty-five years imprisonment, if convicted on the § 924(c) 
charge.  Second, it failed to advise him that the twenty-five 
year sentence must run consecutively to any other sentence 
imposed by the Court.  Third, it failed to inform him of the 
maximum penalty if convicted – life imprisonment.  While 
the Government acknowledges these failures, it posits that the 
District Court‟s shortcomings, viewed in the totality of the 
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circumstances, did not render Booker‟s waiver involuntary or 
unknowing. 
 We have not applied a specific formula for 
determining whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary, but 
we have explicitly required courts to inform a defendant of 
the range of possible punishments before making a decision 
on whether to waive counsel.  Moskovits, 86 F.3d at 1306; see 
Jones, 452 F.3d at 233.  In this case, the District Court not 
only misinformed Booker of the applicable mandatory 
minimum, it also failed to articulate a maximum sentence for 
Count Five so that Booker could ascertain the range of 
possible punishments for the offense.  Instead, it simply stated 
the mandatory minimum and provided no information on the 
extent to which the Court could sentence him above the 
minimum.  The fact that the District Court similarly failed to 
state that the twenty-five year mandatory minimum for Count 
Five was to run consecutive to any other sentence imposed by 
the Court, further exacerbated the error, resulting in a twenty-
year understatement of the amount of mandatory 
imprisonment facing Booker, if convicted.  Here, Booker 
faced a range of twenty-five years to life imprisonment if 
convicted of the § 924(c) charge in Count Five.  Booker 
should have had the benefit of this information in deciding 
whether to waive his constitutional right to counsel. 
 The Government suggests that we look at the entire 
record and conclude that the District Court‟s errors did not 
constitutionally impair Booker‟s waiver.  The Government 
notes that Booker was unequivocal in his desire to represent 
himself.  It also posits that any error in the District Court‟s 
colloquy had no impact on Booker‟s decision to waive his 
right to counsel based on the total period of incarceration that 
Booker faced for various other crimes unrelated to those 
15 
 
before the District Court, and the fact that he was aware that 
he faced an additional thirty years of imprisonment for the 
current charges.   
 These arguments are unpersuasive for a number of 
reasons.  First, “we [have] reject[ed] the approach of some of 
our sister Circuits that allows examination of the record as a 
whole in an attempt to divine what the defendant understands 
about the consequences of proceeding pro se.”  Jones, 452 
F.3d at 232.  In doing so, we acknowledged that “[a] 
complete, on-the-record colloquy with the defendant, one that 
assures he understands all the risks of proceeding without an 
attorney at the time he makes that choice, is in our view a 
significantly better way of protecting the right to counsel than 
the whole-record approach.”  Id.  Second, the Government‟s 
suggestion that the District Court‟s errors were harmless or 
otherwise bore no impact on Booker‟s decision to waive his 
right to counsel seem to controvert our primary focus 
regarding the constitutionality of waiver colloquies.  It is the 
District Court that bears the burden of ensuring that a 
defendant is acting voluntarily and with the appropriate 
knowledge before relinquishing his rights.  Peppers, 302 F.3d 
at 130-31.  Because we have been steadfast in requiring 
district courts to uphold this obligation, we see no reason to 
engage in an after-the-fact, subjective determination of what 
information did or did not influence Booker‟s decision.6  
                                              
6
 Although our resolution of this case is grounded in our 
jurisprudence regarding waiver of the right to counsel, we 
have also espoused similar notions regarding waiver in the 
guilty plea context.  See Jamison v. Klem, 544 F.3d 266, 274, 
276-77 (3d Cir. 2008).  In Jamieson v. Klem, we held that a 
guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary where the trial 
16 
 
Finally, because we have characterized defective waivers as 
structural errors, a totality of the circumstances approach 
seems antithetical to the idea that some errors are so 
fundamental that they, on their face, trigger the need for a 
new trial.  See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 
(1984) (“Since the right of self-representation is a right that 
when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial 
outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not 
amenable to „harmless error‟ analysis.  The right is either 
respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.”); 
accord United States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 
2002).        
 In light of the District Court‟s failure to state the range 
of possible punishments, we find that Booker‟s waiver of 
counsel was not voluntary and knowing.  Because such 
ineffective waivers are structural errors, and because the right 
to counsel impacts all of the charges considered at trial, we 
will vacate the District Court‟s judgment and sentence on 
Counts One, Four and Five and will remand the case to the 
District Court for a new trial.    
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the 
District Court‟s judgment and sentence for Counts One, Four 
and Five.  We will remand the case to the District Court for a 
new trial.  
                                                                                                     
court failed to advise the defendant of the mandatory 
minimum that he would face as a result of pleading guilty.  
Because we found the waiver to be defective, we vitiated the 
guilty plea and granted the petitioner a writ of habeas corpus. 
United States of America v. Christopher Booker, No. 07-2835 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, concurring 
 
 I concur with and for the most part join in Judge 
Greenaway, Jr.’s, well-crafted opinion, which concludes that 
appellant Booker is entitled to a reversal of his convictions and 
that there should be a new trial on all three counts of the 
indictment in which he was charged and for which he was 
convicted.  In a merits disposition, however, I would limit my 
agreement to a reversal of the conviction on Count Five, the 
only count on which Booker asserts on this appeal that the 
District Court erred in describing the range of punishments to 
which he would be subject if convicted.  But I nevertheless 
substantially join in the opinion and agree to a judgment 
granting Booker a new trial on all three counts because the 
government conceded at oral argument that if we found in favor 
of Booker by reason of the District Court’s error in advising him 
of the penalties on Count Five he would be entitled to a new 
trial on the entire case.
1
   
                                                 
1
 In its brief the government implicitly made the same 
concession as it did not suggest that we should affirm the 
convictions on the other two counts even if we held that there 
was reversible error with respect to the waiver of counsel on 
Count Five.  I also observe that Judge Greenaway, Jr.’s opinion 
indicates that because “Booker’s waiver of counsel was not 
voluntary and knowing” it was a structural error and “the right 
to counsel impacts all of the charges considered at trial.”  
Consequently, the opinion remands the case for a new trial on all 
counts.  I certainly agree that the waiver of counsel had an 
impact on Booker’s defense on all three counts but, for the 
  2 
 I believe that in a merits determination notwithstanding 
the error on the Count Five waiver proceedings the correct result 
would be that Booker is not entitled to a new trial on Counts 
One and Four for the following reasons.  I start my analysis by 
pointing out that the District Court correctly told Booker that he 
faced a custodial sentence on Count One of five years and the 
Court sentenced him to that term on that count.  Thus, Booker 
cannot make a meritorious complaint regarding either the 
proceedings that allowed him to waive counsel or challenging 
the length of the sentence on that count.
2
  In reaching this 
conclusion, I recognize that if he had counsel at trial the counsel 
would have represented him on the entire case, but the crucial 
point is that he was willing to waive counsel on Count One and 
consequently he should not be heard to complain that he was 
unrepresented on that count as he knew the sentence he faced if 
convicted on that count.  If we granted him a new trial in a 
merits determination on Count One by reason of the error in the 
waiver of counsel proceeding on Count V, we would be 
awarding him an unjustified collateral benefit from our finding 
of that error.  In short, I see no reason to hold that we should 
recognize a spill-over effect of the error on Count Five infecting 
the proceedings leading to the conviction on Count One.   
                                                                                                             
reasons that I will explain, I nevertheless do not agree that 
Booker is entitled to a new trial on Counts One and Four. 
2
 I limit my comments with respect to the length of the sentence 
to the waiver of counsel proceedings.  I am not addressing other 
bases for possible challenges to the sentence. 
  3 
 The legal situation with respect to Count Four is more 
complex than the circumstances surrounding Count One.  When 
Booker sought to waive his right to counsel the Court told him 
that the maximum custodial term for a conviction on that count 
was 20 years whereas under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) it actually was 
25 years.  The Court compounded the error when it sentenced 
Booker to a 262-month term on the conviction on that count to 
run concurrently with the sentence on Count One, a period 
exceeding by 22 months the maximum term that the Court told 
him it could impose if he was convicted on Count Four.  Yet for 
reasons that are not evident to me Booker does not seek a 
reversal because of the incorrect advice the Court gave him with 
respect to the maximum term on Count Four.
3
      
 When we craft an appropriate remedy for the Count IV 
error I think that United States v. Moskovits, 86 F.3d 1303 (3d 
Cir. 1996), should guide us.  In Moskovits, the defendant, who 
was represented by counsel, was convicted at a jury trial and 
sentenced to a 15-year custodial term.  Subsequently, the district 
court granted the defendant a new trial on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
motion on the ground that his trial counsel had been ineffective. 
 At the time the court granted the defendant the new trial it also 
granted his request that he be permitted to represent himself at 
                                                 
3
 Inasmuch as we are granting Booker a new trial on all three 
counts he has not suffered any prejudice from the circumstance 
that his attorney did not raise the Count Four issue on this 
appeal. 
 
  4 
that trial.  But when the court advised the defendant of the perils 
of waiving counsel it did not include information setting forth 
the range of punishments he faced if convicted at a new trial.  
The defendant did represent himself at the new trial and he was 
convicted and sentenced to a 20-year term.   
 On the defendant’s appeal we held that there had been 
error in the waiver of counsel proceeding because the district 
court did not advise the defendant of the sentence he faced if 
convicted at the retrial.  Yet we did not direct that he be granted 
a new trial as we held that “the appropriate remedy for the 
deprivation is to affirm the conviction but impose a fifteen-year 
ceiling on [his] sentence.”  Moskovits, 86 F.3d at 1309.  In 
reaching our conclusion we pointed out that the court already 
had sentenced the defendant to a 15-year term on the offense for 
which he was convicted and, accordingly, the defendant was 
aware before the retrial that the court could impose that sentence 
if he was convicted again.  In light of our holding in Moskovits, 
I conclude that in the absence of the government’s concession 
Booker would not be entitled to a new trial on Count Four.
4
  
                                                 
4
 An equivalent remedy cannot be applied as relief for the error 
on Count Five because the custodial sentence of five years that 
the District Court told Booker could be imposed on that count 
was illegal as by statute a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 
years to run consecutively to the other sentences being imposed 
was required for a conviction on that count.  We hardly can 
direct the Court to impose an illegal sentence. 
 
  5 
Rather, he would be entitled to be resentenced on Count Four to 
a sentence with a 20-year ceiling, the term that the Court said 
could be imposed when Booker waived his right to counsel on 
that count.  As with Count I in a merits determination we should 
not recognize a spill-over effect infecting the proceedings on 
Count Four.
5
 
 Finally, what seems to me would be the correct result on 
a merits disposition here is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364, 101 
S.Ct. 665, 667-68 (1981), where the Court indicated that 
“[c]ases involving Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject to 
the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury 
suffered from the constitutional violation and should not 
unnecessarily infringe on competiting interests.”  Though it is 
true that the Court also said that the correct approach has been 
“to identify and then neutralize the taint by tailoring relief 
appropriate in the circumstances to assure the defendant the 
effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial,” id. at 365, 101 
S.Ct. at 668, the overarching principle in Morrison regarding 
“tailored” remedies is applicable here.  In Moskovits, we 
thought that Morrison should be followed when we crafted our 
                                                 
5
 A person reading my opinion might wonder why I have written 
it in view of the fact that I am joining in the result of the 
majority opinion, which grants Booker a retrial on all three 
counts of conviction.  The explanation is not complex.  The 
government concedes that if the waiver of counsel is held to be 
invalid on Count V, Booker will be entitled to a new trial on all 
three counts and for that reason I agree to granting that relief.   
  6 
remedy and it seems to me that the correct result on a merits 
determination would be to follow the Moskovits model here.
6
 
  
                                                 
6
 In Morrison, the Supreme Court assumed that the 
government’s wrongful conduct in approaching the defendant 
violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel but 
nevertheless it affirmed her conviction because the conduct did 
not prejudice her.  Similarly the proceedings on Count Five did 
not prejudice Booker on the waiver proceedings on either Count 
One or Count Four and thus should not lead to a reversal of 
Booker’s conviction on those counts.  The possibility that 
Booker suffered prejudice at the trial because he did not have 
counsel on Counts One and Four is immaterial as the Court 
warned him of that possibility when he waived counsel.  Thus, 
when he waived counsel he took the chance that he would 
prejudice his defense on Counts One and Four. 
